





Motivation


Charging / Parking Spaces:



Taxi-Passenger Matching:



Ride-Sharing:



The Assignment Problem:

- Weighted bipartite graph
- N agents compete for R resources
- Each agent is interested in a subset (\mathcal{R}^n) of the resources
- Goal: maximize the social welfare (sum of utilities)

Applications:

- Role allocation (e.g., robot team formation)
- Task assignment (e.g., taxi-passenger matching)
- Resource allocation (e.g., parking/charging spaces)

Challenges in Real World:

- Distributed nature
- Information restrictive (lack of communication/responsiveness, partial feedback)
- Large scale

Hundreds of thousands of autonomous agents (e.g., IoT devices, intelligent infrastructure, autonomous vehicles, etc.)

Existing algorithms require: (i) runtime that increases with the total problem size, even if the agents are interested in a few resources, (ii) significant amount of inter-agent communication.

Need for **fast convergence** to allocations of **high social welfare**.

Humans are routinely called upon to coordinate in *large scale*, and under *dynamic* and *unpredictable* demand. Driving factor: principle of **altruism**.

ALMA: ALtruistic Matching heuristic

Agents make decisions locally, based on (i) the contest for resources that *they* are interested in, (ii) the agents that are interested in the *same* resources. If each agent is interested in only a *subset* of the total resources, ALMA converges in *constant* time. The same is not true for other algorithms, which require time polynomial in the *total* number of agents/resources, even if the aforementioned condition holds. The condition holds by default in many real-world applications; agents have only local knowledge of the world, there is typically a cost associated with acquiring a resource, or agents are simply only interested in resources in their vicinity (e.g., urban environments).

Algorithm ALMA: Altruistic Matching Heuristic.

- Go over the set of preferred resources $\mathcal{R}^n \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ sequentially.
- If collision, back-off with probability that depends on the utility loss of switching to the remaining resources (e.g., $P(\text{loss}) = 1 - \text{loss}$).

$$\text{loss}_n^i = \frac{\sum_{j=i+1}^k u_n(r_i) - u_n(r_j)}{k - i}$$

- { Good alternatives → More likely to back-off
- { No good alternatives → Less likely to back-off

If back-off → select an alternative resource and examine its availability.

Altruism-Inspired Behavior Give up a resource:


- To someone who values it more, to increase the social welfare
 - To be nice to others; especially when there are equally good alternatives
- Faster convergence – outweighs the loss in utility.

Theorem 1 (Convergence Speed).

$$\mathcal{O} \left(\max_{n' \in \mathcal{U}_r \in \mathcal{R}^n, \mathcal{N}^r} R^{n'} \frac{2 - p_n^*}{2(1 - p_n^*)} \left(\frac{1}{p_n^*} \log(\max_{r \in \mathcal{R}^n} N^r) + \max_{n' \in \mathcal{U}_r \in \mathcal{R}^n, \mathcal{N}^r} R^{n'} \right) \right) = \text{constant}$$


Highlights:

- Decentralized, completely uncoupled, no communication, only partial feedback
- Constant* in the total problem size convergence time, under reasonable assumptions on the preference domain
- High social welfare in a variety of scenarios: synthetic and *real* data, time constraints, on-line settings




Simulation Results

Resource Allocation in a Cartesian Map



On-line Taxi Request Match



(1, 3, 0.1)	(1, 1, -)	(0, ∞, 0.1)	(0, ∞, 0.5)	(0, ∞, 1.0)
0.79	0.85	0.78	0.69	0.67

Table 1: Empirical Competitive Ratio of ALMA

